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Friday, February 11, 2011

Appalachian honeymoon turns to lovers’ quarrel for Reliance and Atlas

April 2010 to be exact, Reliance won the hand of much-smaller Atlas, agreeing to pay $1.7 billion for a 40% joint-venture stake in Atlas’ big Appalachian leasehold on prime turf for the Marcellus Shale play. But before the year was out, Atlas’ board had also agreed to sell their entire company for $4.3 billion in cash (some shares) and assumed debt to Chevron, runner-up to Reliance in a field of 18 rivals in the JV beauty contest ushered for Atlas by Jefferies. The Chevron takeover goes to a vote by Atlas shareholders February 16.
Just as the proxy materials for that post-Valentine’s Day vote were going out, Reliance dropped a bombshell. In a January 10 letter to Atlas, Reliance CEO Walter Van de Vijver challenged the wisdom of Atlas’ board and questioned the behavior of Chevron and Jefferies. “We believe Reliance, as Atlas Energy’s JV partner and a company with substantial financial resources, would have been the most natural and obvious potential transaction partner for Atlas Energy,” Van de Vijver wrote. “This is especially true in light of the many assurances” by Atlas management about Reliance being its “preferred partner” if Atlas sought a “whole-company transaction.”
Instead, Reliance finds itself footing 75% of what will become Chevron’s Marcellus program, to the tune of $1.3 billion in drilling carries.

Where did this relationship go wrong?
Ask Jefferies. After representing Atlas in the JV search, Jefferies investment bankers made a routine call on Chevron about potential acquistions and later pitched Atlas as a candidate to Chevron last June. Chevron agreed to talks, if Atlas was interested. Their canoodling went on into mid-September, all without Reliance’s knowledge. Then Chevron demanded exclusivity to make a final offer. Even though that window ran out November 4, still nobody told Reliance Atlas was up for sale. Chevron’s belated bid came in at $38.25/share for Atlas, now worth about $43/share adjusted. That is ~50% over Atlas’ close on September 13 and a 37% premium to its price on the eve of the deal announcement November 8. Jefferies, which had begun by pitching Atlas to Chevron at a price between $70 and $102/share, delivered a fairness opinion on the Chevron offer to Atlas’ board. Using standard methods like prior deals and historic discount rates, Jefferies was able to rationalize a value for Atlas at half what it had first proposed. Reliance says that method left “a significant discount to the value attributed to the same assets in our joint venture.” Jefferies stands behind the fairness opinion, noting different methods gave similar results. Atlas also got a positive fairness opinion from Deutsche Bank. Chevron’s offer topped both the Jefferies and Deutsche Bank opinions. But together, the opinions make it look like Reliance overpaid. Some analysts report Chevron’s price equates to only about $9,000/acre for Atlas, minus the Reliance JV acreage

Neither Atlas nor Jefferies ever approached Reliance with a company sale offer despite Reliance’s aggressive JV interest. Nor did either let on to Reliance there were takeover talks with Chevron. SEC filings say Jefferies pitched the Chevron deal to Atlas’ board by noting Chevron was one of the few companies positioned to do such a deal, since other majors had already made or were considering big shale acquisitions. Jefferies argued Reliance would not be interested and was already tapped out. But then some say Jefferies at this point was working for Chevron on the buy-side, not for Atlas. Jefferies had no obligation to call Reliance.
Chevron had offered to make a premium bid if it got exclusivity and its offer looked good at $38.25/share. It was $3.2 billion in cash, some midstream equity, plus the assumption of $1.1 billion in Atlas debt and the sale of Atlas investment partnerships. But exclusivity meant the Atlas board was unable to shop for a better deal.A barrage of shareholder lawsuits has since prompted Chevron to chip in an extra $0.10/share to settle the litigation. With a subsequent jump in value for Atlas pipeline units, the deal is now worth more than $43/share for Atlas.

So what could happen now?
One endgame has Reliance selling its Atlas JV stake to Chevron. Another sees Reliance just pulling out of the Atlas JV or amending it. Then again, Van de Vijver’s letter hints Reliance could make its own bid for Atlas to rival Chevron’s, “enhancing the interests of the various Atlas Energy constituencies.” After the January 10 letter was disclosed in a securities filing last week, Atlas shares jumped to almost $50 when it was revealed Reliance had hired its own investment bankers (Perella Weinberg Partners) and lawyers (Kirkland & Ellis). But no counter offer has yet emerged from Reliance and Atlas stock has ebbed to about $45. That is still slightly above Chevron’s offer, giving some hope to Atlas shareholders and arbitragers for a better deal.

BG bullish on global gas 2020 demand outlook, plans to increase production to 1.6 million boepd, driven by Australia LNG, US Shale and Brazil pre-salt.

BG Group, in its long-term strategy update, was particularly bullish, predicting gas demand will grow 3% a year between now and 2020. The strongest increase in gas demand growth is set to come in Asia, led by China.






















Key drivers of growth are going to be oil substitution in emerging economies mainly industrial, commercial and residential.



























The company is on track to expand its exploration and production business by 6% to 8% on a compound annual growth rate basis out to 2020, and that the mid-point of that range — 7% — could be achieved from existing discoveries.

This growth would be supported partly by an increase in its US shale gas operations, where estimates of net production by 2015 have now increased from 100,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day to 190,000 boepd.
The company was also bullish about the potential of BG Group’s assets in Brazil’s Santos basin, BG Group raised its estimate for future net production to 550,000 barrels oil equivalent per day by 2020, a 37.5% increase on the 2010 estimate.
The company’s estimate of future net production from Australia was 210,000 barrels oil equivalent per day remained at the same level as in 2010.

Thursday, February 10, 2011

Chesapeake to divest Fayetteville assets for ~$5 billion



Chesapeake Energy Corporation has announced that, as part of its 2011-12 strategic and financial 25/25 plan, the company has decided to sell all of its Fayetteville Shale assets, as well as its equity investments in Frac Tech Holdings LLC and Chaparral Energy Inc. If these sales are completed, Chesapeake anticipates that the combined pre-tax proceeds could exceed $5.0 billion. Chesapeake owns 25.8% of Frac Tech, a leading provider of oil and natural gas well stimulation services and products with expertise in high-pressure hydraulic fracturing. Chesapeake owns 20% of Chaparral, which has operations in the Mid-Continent, the Permian Basin, Ark-La-Tex, NorthTexas, the Gulf Coast and the Rocky Mountains, with Proved NPV10 of $1.77 billion.
Fayetteville asset overview:
  • Approximately 487,000 net acres of leasehold with 75% of WI; BP is the JV partner with 25% WI
  • Current net production of approximately 415 MMcfe/d
  • As of 30 Jun 2010, Net Proved reserves were 2,404 Bcfe
  • 4,900 Potential net unrisked undrilled wells
  • 9,300 Bcfe of Potential net unrisked resource.




Are we seeing Consolidation across US shale plays moving to larger companies????
  • In 2008, BP Plc bought 25% interest in Chesapeake’s Fayetteville Shale operations for $1.9 billion after buying producing natural gas properties in the Arkoma Basin Woodford Shale play for US$1.75 billion.
  • In 2009, Exxon acquired XTO Energy for $41 billion.
  • In 2010, Chevron Corp. bought Atlas Energy Inc. for $4.3 billion to add acreage in the gas-rich Marcellus Shale.
  • In 2011, Chesapeake to divest Fayetteville assets for ~$5 billion.


Pan Orient increases South East Asia drilling budget


Pan Orient, an Alberta based oil and gas exploration and production company, will shell out more this year on its exploration and production activities in South East Asia. According to its 2011 Capital Program and Operations Update, the Company is planning to spend around C$71 million as against its 2010 capital budget of about C$67 million.

Highlights:
  • Firm capital program of $71 million allocated $44 million to Thailand and $27 million to Indonesia
  • Thailand drilling program to include 37 wells comprised of 11 exploration wells and 26 development or appraisal wells intended to grow current production for average 2011 oil sales of 5,000 to 6,000 BOPD
  • Indonesia drilling program to include 6 high impact exploration wells, commencing in mid March 2011 with three wells at Batu Gajah

Thailand
  • Block L33/44 (60% & Operator): Two 2010 oil discoveries at early stage appraisal
  • Block L44/43 (60% & Operator): 3 fields including 1 2010 multi-zone oil discovery at early stage development. Active early 2011 exploration program
  • Block L53/48 (100% & Operator): L53-A oil discovery at early stage appraisal. First appraisal well L53-A1 currently drilling and  L53-C exploration well about to test   

Indonesia
  • South CPP PSC (90% & Operator): 250 kms 2D Seismic 2011 – 1 well 2012
  • Batu Gajah PSC (90% & Operator):3 exploration wells in Q1/11 targeting mid case prospective resources of 109MM bbl and 429 Bcf gas (net POE)
  • Citarum PSC (69% & Operator): 3 exploration wells in Q3/11 targeting 966 Bcf gas (net POE)   

Top Oil and Gas Deals of 2010


Top 20 global deals by value – Multiple categories
  • Sale of a partial interest in one E&P company by another industry player, e.g., sale of 51% stake in Cairn India by Cairn Energy; Lukoil’s stock repurchase from ConocoPhillips; E.ON’s sale of 3.5% interest in Gazprom; and Shell’s divestiture of a 10% interest in Woodside
  • Chinese/Asian NOCs aggressively buying up global assets, in particular in South America e.g., parts of Repsol’s Brazil portfolio and  Pan American Energy, and elsewhere, e.g., ConocoPhillips’ interest in Syncrude project.
  • BP’s divestments for funding post-Macondo costs, including sale of interest in Pan American Energy and assets across three countries to Apache.
  • Unconventional and conventional acquisitions by Majors, including Atlas Energy by Chevron; Arrow Energy by Shell, Devon’s Brazil and Azerbaijan portfolio by BP.


Global map view of selected, key assets traded during 2010



We have also recently published a report for E&P Business Development and New Ventures professionals working on deals globally. This report provides information on $93 billion of global oil and gas assets on the market.
The report provides details on ~500 opportunities:
·         Assets for sale
·         Corporate M&A opportunities
·         JV opportunities
·         Exploration farm-ins

You can view a sample copy of this report at http://www.derrickpetroleum.com/reports2.html


Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Trades involving partial company stakes accounted for 16% of total Global M&A activity in 2010, e.g., Cairn India, Gazprom, Lukoil


Global Oil and gas Corporate deals back to historic levels around 45%, down from 2009 high
Corporate deals as a share of the total was 45% in 2010, closer to the historic range 34-37% in 2007-2008 than 2009 at 74% (64% without the XOM-XTO deal).
 

Trades involving partial company stakes accounted for 16% of total Global M&A activity in 2010
The total value of trade involving partial company stakes in 2010 was $33bn, whereas the total deal value for such deals put together for previous three years (2009, 2008 & 2007) was only $5.2bn.  Main contributors to that figure was from 2 deals: OMV selling 21% stake in MOL to Surgutneftegas for $1.9bn (2009); and Repsol YPF divesting part of its  stake in the YPF unit to Petersen Group for $2.2bn (2007).













We have also recently published a report for E&P Business Development and New Ventures professionals working on deals globally. This report provides information on $93 billion of global oil and gas assets on the market.

The report provides details on ~500 opportunities:
  • Assets for sale
  • Corporate M&A opportunities
  • JV opportunities
  • Exploration farm-ins
You can view a sample copy of this report at http://www.derrickpetroleum.com/reports2.html






Tuesday, February 8, 2011

Conventionals are still conventional, accounting for 69% in 2010, up from 51% in 2009


Share of unconventionals in total deal value reduced from 49% in 2009 to 31% in 2010. However, a significant part of the unconventional deal value in 2009 was due to a single deal, the acquisition of XTO by ExxonMobil (unconventionals’ share without XTO would be 30%).



Number of deals greater than $1bn, both conventional and unconventional, were greater in 2010 than in any of the previous three years. Clearly the deal market was robust for both types of assets. 

Majors continued to acquire unconventional assets, but also got back into the conventional deals market

In 2010, the Majors bought conventional and unconventional assets in more balanced measures unlike 2009 when the Majors focused predominantly on unconventional assets. For 2010, the split was 35% conventionals/65% unconventionals based on the largest deals as show in chart.
The unconventional assets acquired by the Majors included
       Marcellus: Shell-East Resources, Chevron-Atlas
       Eagle Ford: Shell from various sellers, BP-Lewis Energy
       Oil sands: Total-Suncor, Total-UTS, BP-Value Creation
       Australia CBM: Shell-Arrow Energy, Total-Santos/Petronas
The conventional assets acquired by the Majors included
       US (ExxonMobil-Ellora)
       GoM: BP-Devon, BP-Shell, Chevron-Devon
       Brazil: BP-Devon
       Azerbaijan: BP/Chevron-Devon
       Uganda: Total-Tullow
       North Sea: BP-Total




We have also recently published a report for E&P Business Development and New Ventures professionals working on deals globally. This report provides information on $93 billion of global oil and gas assets on the market.
The report provides details on ~500 opportunities:
·         Assets for sale
·         Corporate M&A opportunities
·         JV opportunities
·         Exploration farm-ins

You can view a sample copy of this report at http://www.derrickpetroleum.com/reports2.html






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